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Abstract 
Biological, brain, and behavioral sciences offer strong and growing support for 
the virtue ethics account of moral judgment and ethical behavior in business 
organizations.  The acquisition of moral agency in business involves the 
recognition, refinement, and habituation through the processes of reflexion 
and reflection of a moral sense encapsulated in innate modules for 
compassion, hierarchy, reciprocity, purity, and affiliation adaptive for 
communal life both in ancestral and modern environments.  The genetic and 
neural bases of morality exist independently of institutional frameworks and 
social structures.  The latter not only shape moral behaviors within 
circumscribed limits, they also imply a plurality and compartmentalization of 
roles which may enable or impede the habituation of virtue.  Becoming a 
virtuous agent entails the practical refinement of predispositions in situ as a 
member of a community of practitioners rather than entailing a normative 
ethical educational project seeking an intellectual resolution of abstract moral 
questions. 
Keywords: community; intuition; metacognition; modularity; moral sense; 
virtue 
In this paper I use conceptual and theoretical resources from the biological, brain, and 
behavioral sciences to argue that the acquisition of moral agency in business involves the 
recognition, refinement, and habituation of a universal modularized moral sense that is 
adaptive for communal life (see Figure 1).  This discourse is located within a classical 
tradition of Aristotelian and Darwinian naturalism and grounds its theory of ethical behavior 
in the biological and behavioral sciences but recognizes that morality is culturally- and 
socially-situated and shaped within circumscribed limits.  The view that Homo sapiens 
possesses an evolved “moral sense” (The Descent of Man, Chapter IV, p.120) and is 
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“constituted by nature” to acquire the virtues (Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, Chapter i, p.31) 
is acknowledged widely by a number of psychologists, biologists (e.g. Flack & de Waal, 
2004; Pinker, 2002; E.O. Wilson, 1998), and philosophers (Frederick, 1995; J.Q. Wilson, 
1993).  Interpreting virtue from this perspective (i.e. that our morality is not “independent of 
our animality”, MacIntyre, 1999a, p.5) bridges complementary traditions in biology, 
psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy, and has important normative implications.  My 
contention is not that biological, brain, and behavioral sciences substitute for ethical 
discourse, rather they offer strong and growing support for the virtue ethics account of moral 
judgment and ethical behavior in business organizations against rival claims (see Oakley & 
Cocking, 2001). 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Business ethics and business schools’ ethics curricula have been resistant towards and 
slow to accommodate new scientific ideas (Messick, 2004).  Indeed more generally the socio-
biologist Edward O. Wilson1 considered it “astonishing” (1998, p.283) that the scientific 
study of ethics has advanced so little since the 19th century, and argued that further scientific 
progress in the moral domain rests on paying attention to: (1) defining the moral sentiments; 
(2) studying the genetics of the moral sentiments and their development in terms of the 
history of ethical systems and the cognitive moral development of individuals living in 
different cultures; (3) exploring the ‘deep history’ of the moral sentiments and why they exist 
at all.  Frederick (1995) described the moral sense as an evolutionary under-layer on which 
socio-cultural ethical systems, principles, and rules are “subsequently built up” (p.290, 
emphases added); to this extent the moral sense comes before virtue.  Notwithstanding these 
various claims, there is a strong caveat: acceding to the view that Homo sapiens possesses an 
innate moral sense (‘innate’ meaning “organized in advance of experience” rather than “un-
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malleable”, see Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009: 1031) does not entail that people are 
“innately good”, rather their evolved nature predisposes them to be “potentially good” with 
respect to the life of the communities of which they are a part (J.Q. Wilson, 1993, p.12). 
The paper is organized as follows: I begin by outlining the need for a scientific account of 
virtue and argue that recent developments in the brain and behavioral sciences offer one 
possibility for such an account; the Darwinian tradition of the ‘moral sense’ is discussed from 
the perspective of the universal basic moral ground rules as adaptations for group living; the 
origins of these biological adaptations are explicated in terms of an innate ‘modularity of 
morality’ juxtaposed alongside a psychological account of moral judgment based on 
complementary systems of reflective and reflexive processing; the ways in which relevant 
features of institutions and social structures interact with and impact upon a modularized and 
reflective/reflexive morality are outlined; finally the paper concludes with a consideration of 
the normative implications of these arguments from the point of view of moral learning and 
moral metacognition.  The paper contributes to the understanding of virtue ethics by offering 
an integrative perspective which bridges a number of disparate traditions. 
1. BACKGROUND AND AIMS 
The Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics, in which intellectual virtues are learned but 
moral virtues are acquired by habit, is not only an appropriate subject of study for business 
ethics researchers, it is also an important practical issue for leaders and managers who are 
concerned with the question of how to be a morally virtuous agent.  In this view moral 
agency is concerned with what it is “to be a particular kind of human being” (Weaver, 2006, 
p.341) and with those aspects of moral character that enable a person to achieve some end 
(telos) which has intrinsic rather than purely instrumental value (Moore, 2005).  The virtue 
perspective applied to business posits that the character of a moral agent is infused with 
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virtuous qualities and strengths that are inherently good, for example, confidence, courage, 
humanity, justice, optimism, resilience, temperance, transcendence, and wisdom (Dutton, 
Roberts, & Bednar, 2010).  Mutual dependence in business organizations, as in any other 
social group involves generosity towards others (Halliday & Johnson, 2009), moreover 
trustworthiness, sympathy, and fairness can serve to maintain and enhance organizations’ 
reputations, and create business opportunities and thereby be pursuant of both intrinsic and 
instrumental ends (Maitland, 1997). 
Virtuous behavior in business organizations is a practical matter at the nexus of biological, 
psychological, and socio-cultural factors: “the more we know about how people actually 
behave in organizations [and why they do] the richer and more informed our moral 
judgments, and more important, our decisions will be” (Solomon, 2003, p.49).  Kantian2 and 
utilitarian ethics with their emphasis on “dispassionate abstract” moral reasoning (Bandura, 
2002, p.102) resonate less well than does virtue ethics with biological, brain, and behavioral 
scientific accounts of how people actually think, decide and act (i.e. through a blend of 
purpose, disposition, affect, cognition, and social engagement).  Both David Hume and Adam 
Smith observed that human morality is subject to the powerful influence of affect, and not 
governed solely by abstract, intellectual rules and rational processes devoid of emotion 
(contra Kant, see Flack & de Waal, 2004).  Within the virtue tradition itself virtues are not 
only behavioral and cognitive they are - as observed by MacIntyre in his foundational work 
After Virtue (1981) - also affective: “virtues are dispositions not only to act in particular ways 
but also to feel in particular ways” (1985, p.149 emphasis added).  An acknowledged 
limitation of evolutionary psychological accounts of morality (e.g. Cosmides & Toobey, 
2004) is the overreliance placed on “purely cognitive rather than emotive [i.e. affective] 
mechanisms” (Messick, 2004: 131).  It is the latter and not the former which provide human 
beings with a sharply focused evaluative lens through which they are able to judge 
 5
effortlessly and quickly (i.e. instinctively) the actions (e.g. cheating or free-riding behaviors) 
of others. 
Cognition, within the biological and behavioral tradition (including moral cognition) is not 
cold, calm, and dispassionate; instead, feelings which are “just as cognitive as other 
percepts”, “neither intangible nor elusive”, and far from being a luxury are vital “internal 
guides” for decision making in complex judgmental situations (Damasio, 1994, p. xv).  
Indeed Haidt (2004) reasoned that when people dichotomize ‘affect’ and ‘cognition’ they 
actually but inadvertently refer to two kinds of cognition, ‘hot’ and ‘cold’.  Moreover, 
Sutherland and Hughes (2000) argued that given the accumulating evidence for the 
significance of affect and the attribution of moral cognition to specific brain regions (with the 
caveat that natural selection processes are the phylogenetic basis for brain structure but they 
do not directly create ethical behaviors, Wasieleski & Hayibor, 2009) it is hard to understand 
why so many philosophers “remain under the spell of Kant” and continue to argue that 
“morality requires a purely rational logic” based on universal rules (p.74). 
In the same way that the study of reasoning in the brain and behavioral sciences has 
embraced the notions of ‘hot’ (i.e. emotionally salient) as well as ‘cold’ (i.e. emotionally 
neutral) cognitions (Goel & Dolan, 2003), the biology, neurology, and psychology of affect 
and emotion now are vital components of the scientific study of business ethics (Beugré, 
2009; Reynolds, 2006; Sonenschein, 2007).  The emergent field of neuroethics bridges 
philosophy and neuroscience, with concerns both for the neuroscience of ethics and the ethics 
of neuroscience in areas such as biomedical ethics (see Salavdor & Folger, 2009 for a 
review).  Human morality is not a question of reason or affect; it is the outcome of a dual 
system of information processing that: (1) implicates reason and affect as sources of ‘data’ in 
moral agency and moral behaviors; (2) is grounded in brain structures which have arisen 
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through the processes of natural selection.  The potential contribution of virtue ethics to the 
management and leadership of business organizations may be better understood and virtue 
‘leveraged’ more effectively by conjoining relevant and complementary aspects of biological 
(i.e. moral sense/moral instinct tradition) and psychological (i.e. dual theory of mind 
tradition) inquiry3 within a view of moral learning as a socially-situated phenomenon (i.e. 
social learning traditions). 
A substantive implication for modern business virtue ethics to be drawn from the scientific 
study of human cognition is that rationalist models of moral judgment can never succeed in 
capturing fully an embodied moral reasoning (Haidt , 2001).  On the other hand a 
“scientifically burnished virtue theory along the lines advocated in the Nicomachean Ethics” 
offers a much closer approximation to how humans actually moralize (Casebeer & 
Churchland, 2003, p.189).  This harks back to Hume who, even though he relied on an 
artificial and empirically inadequate dichotomy between ‘passion’ and ‘reason’ (Sutherland 
& Hughes, 2000), was much closer to modern biological and psychological accounts than 
many of his contemporaries.  And, as Adam Smith pointed out in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759), moral distinctions are derived “not from pure abstract reasoning alone, but 
from a moral sense” (Arnhart, 1998, p.70).  More broadly, and unlike its rival moral 
philosophical traditions, virtue ethics not only is a line of philosophical inquiry that ought not 
be pursued in isolation from the biological and behavioral sciences, it is uniquely placed 
amongst moral philosophies to form a bridge to these other traditions making new extensions 
possible (see Solomon, 2004a).  It is perhaps ironic therefore that MacIntyre (2009) 
bemoaned the irredeemable fragmentation of disciplines in modern scholarship and the losses 
of “any large sense of and concern for enquiry into the relationships between disciplines” and 
“the conception of disciplines as contributing to a single shared enterprise” (p.174).  
MacIntyre called for an integrated account of the unity of ‘being human’ from physicists, 
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chemists and biologists, historians, economists and sociologists.  Given that evolution has 
equipped Homo sapiens with a moral cognition that is indisputably affect-laden it would not 
be unreasonable to add behavioral and brain scientists to MacIntyre’s list. 
2. THE DARWINIAN MORAL SENSE 
An innate moral sense predisposes Homo sapiens to specific types of virtuous behaviors 
which are conducive to communal living, but the particular expression of the moral sense is 
shaped by developmental, contextual, social, and cultural forces (Arnhart, 1998; Frederick, 
1995; J.Q. Wilson, 1993).  In elaborating this argument I shall begin by outlining an 
evolutionary account for moral behavior based on the concept of an evolved ‘moral sense’ or 
‘moral instinct’, postulated as adaptive for inclusive fitness in ancestral (proper4) 
environments and relevant to an understanding of intuitive moral judgment and moral agency 
in modern (actual) environments.  The roots of this tradition may be traced at least as far back 
as Adam Smith, but most notably to Darwin and The Descent of Man, and Selection in 
Relation to Sex (first published 24th February, 1871).  Darwin described the ‘moral sense’ (the 
title of the fourth chapter of The Descent of Man) as the “most noble of all the attributes of 
man” (p.120) accounting for his [sic] ‘social virtues’, and an innate sense of fairness on the 
presupposition that: 
“…primeval man, at a very remote period, was influenced by the praise and 
blame of his fellows…members of the same tribe would approve of conduct 
which appeared to them to be the general good, and would reprobate that which 
appeared evil.  To do good unto others – to do unto others as ye would they 
should do unto you – is the foundation stone of morality” (1874, p.131). 
The Darwinian ‘moral sense’ is part of a tradition of empiricism and naturalism with a 
lineage through Hume, Smith, and Hutcheson reaching back to Aquinas, and ultimately 
Aristotle (Sutherland & Hughes, 2000) summarized by Arnhart (1998) thus: (1) the good is 
the desirable; (2) only human beings can pursue happiness as a deliberate conception of the 
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fullest satisfaction of their desires; (3) only human beings have the capacities for reason and 
language that allows them to judge moral actions in the light of previous experiences and 
future projections; (4) human beings are social and political animals, and their affective, 
cognitive, and conative capacities are fulfilled in social and political life; (5) the fulfillment 
of Homo sapiens’ moral potential requires social learning, habituation, and the exercising of 
prudential judgments with regard to the needs and social practices of the group; (6) 
consciousness allows human beings not only to reflect upon and understand their own moral 
cognitions, i.e. think about them, make sense of them and be consistent (Hartman, 2004), but 
also to formulate what is right and wrong and act in accordance with those conceptions5. 
From an evolutionary perspective these assertions make sense if for no other reason than 
because Homo sapiens is the most gregarious of all the primates6, therefore individual 
survival in ancestral environments was entwined inextricably with the existence and 
flourishing of ‘the tribe’.  At the most fundamental level genes, the biological bases of 
behavior, are programmed to replicate themselves, and in this respect the organisms that 
house them have been depicted as nothing more than ‘gene survival machines’ (Dawkins, 
1989).  However, members of Homo sapiens’ social groups in ancestral environments were 
likely to be both genetically related and unrelated.  Therefore any explanation of morality 
which implicates behaviors such as altruism and reciprocity towards non-kin requires also a 
‘non-selfish’ (i.e. cooperative) explanation (Midgley, 2010a).  Indeed, in the foreword to the 
30th anniversary edition of The Selfish Gene and in something of a volte face Dawkins (2006) 
acknowledged that a “good alternative” to the book’s chosen title “would have been The 
Cooperative Gene” (p.ix). 
At an early stage in human evolution cooperative behavior probably became adaptive to 
the extent that groups which were able to band together in order to forage, hunt, and defend 
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themselves “were more likely to survive than were solitary individuals” (J.Q. Wilson, 1993, 
p.70).  Across history and cultures human beings exhibit altruistic behaviors (“selfishness in 
disguise”, Dawkins, 1989, p.4) in acts of apparently “unnecessary kindnesses” (Nicholson, 
2000, p.183).  From the perspective of the individual gene, fitness is inclusive (i.e. extends to 
the group of individuals which share a particular gene in common) and the value of altruistic 
behavior towards kin is clear: if kin survive the chances of the information encapsulated in a 
given genetic code surviving and being passed on are greatly increased.  But what is less 
easily accounted for is altruistic (i.e. unselfish) behavior towards non-kin (i.e. genetically 
unrelated) members of one’s immediate social group, and to an even greater extent, kindness 
and altruism towards strangers. 
Biologists have explained this phenomenon in terms of a variety of processes that enable 
cooperative group living (see Wasieleski & Hayibor, 2009, p.592-595): (1) reciprocal 
altruism: mechanisms for providing benefits to non-kin will persist so long as help is 
reciprocated at some point in the future; (2) social contract theory: social exchanges are 
controlled by social contract information-processing algorithms which enable individuals to 
monitor and maintain mutually beneficial social relationships, e.g. intuitively detecting 
cheating, or potential cheating, behaviors; (3) social dominance practices: emergence of 
dominance hierarchies and the development of group norms (i.e. conventions and culture) 
serve to maintain group cohesion; (4) cooperative coalitions: exercising punitive sanctions 
against non-cooperative behavior, e.g. identify, punish and discourage ‘free-riding’ in the 
group.  Given that cooperative individuals tend to live longer and have more offspring, those 
genes which predisposed individuals towards cooperation, reciprocity and altruism came to 
predominate in the population (Dawkins, 1989; E.O. Wilson, 1998).  Hence selfish genes had 
to be unselfish enough to predispose group-living hominids to engage in cooperative 
behaviors towards non-kin as well as kin (e.g. in food sharing, or defending the group).  Put 
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simply: the extreme view of self-interest and competition within species promulgated by 
“pseudo-Darwinists” would create a society that was “not just nasty, but also unworkable” 
(Midgley, 2010b, p.38), hence for a group-living and “intensely social” (Haidt, 2004, p.286) 
primate such as Homo sapiens such a society could never have been created (i.e. evolved) in 
the first place, and is nothing less than a denial of the Darwinian view of human nature. 
Communal living is a vital aspect of Homo sapiens nature, and ‘evolutionary altruism’ is 
compatible with ‘Aristotelian altruism’: “altruism isn’t self-sacrifice; it’s just a more 
reasonable conception of the self, as tied up intimately with community, with friends and 
family who may, indeed, count (even to us) more than we do” (Solomon, 2004b, p.1025).  
The moral systems of thinking, feeling, and acting that codify and enact these ‘instincts’ are 
co-decided by biology (“nature”) and society (“nurture”) (Wasieleski & Hayibor, 2009, 
p.588).  In this respect moral capacity is analogous to linguistic capacity (cf. Chomsky)7: 
“…in the same way we are born with a moral capacity, and a strong tendency to 
absorb the moral values of our social environment, but we are not born with a 
moral code in place.  The filling-in is done by the social environment often 
dictated by the demands of the physical environment” (Flack & de Waal, 2004, p. 
32) 
Patterns of profound similarity with regard to ‘moral capacity’ have been observed by 
scholars working across disparate fields (Frederick, 1995).  Proponents of ‘positive 
psychology’ such as Seligman (2002) have, independently of evolutionary biologists (e.g. 
Hauser, 2006) and social psychologists (e.g. Haidt, 2001), distilled their own set of ‘virtues’ 
which appear to be widely endorsed (e.g. found in Confucianism and Christianity).  These 
attributes vary in their details and expression according to the social, cultural, and 
institutional complexes in which they are developed and expressed (e.g. ‘humanity’ in 
Confucius is not identical with caritas in Aquinas, Seligman, 2002).  See also Haidt’s (2001) 
social intuitionist model of moral reasoning, and Blum’s (1998, p.233) discussion of how 
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communities “tell us how to apply our general moral principles to the world”.  Furthermore, 
virtue-based intellectual and moral principles are to be found in Buddhism’s ‘eightfold path’: 
wisdom (right view and intention); ethical conduct (right speech, action, and livelihood); 
mental development (right effort, mindfulness, and concentration).  Indeed Lawrence (2004) 
has proposed that the universality of the moral sense could be tested by systematically 
examining the “basic moral ground rules” (p.63) taught by all religions since these show 
ostensibly a high degree of similarity.  Additionally, business ethicists such as Scott (2002) 
and environmental virtue ethicists such as van Wensveen (2005) have suggested other 
relevant virtues in their respective domains which appear also to connect to a set of 
‘universals’.  Table 1 offers a comparison of selected systems of virtues from a variety of 
historical, philosophical, scientific, and cultural traditions that appear to “generate 
generalized characterizations of virtue that hold across different social settings” (Weaver, 
2006, p.343).  Morality has bio-culturally based widely-shared attributes and recent 
developments in biological, brain and behavioral sciences depict a modularized morality 
‘wired into’ Homo sapiens by nature. 
[TABLE 1] 
3. THE MODULARITY OF MORALITY 
The roots of the morality and universal sense of right and wrong which nature ‘built into’ 
the mind of Homo sapiens were attributed by Hauser (2006) to a number of innate, 
instinctive, and intuitive moral principles and processes.  These may have evolved as result of 
increased gregariousness in the shift towards living in relatively large social groups that 
occurred in response to environmental changes during the Pleistocene8 (see Mithen, 1996).  
Hauser favors the view that nature pre-loads abstract rules or principles for moral conduct 
(such as the principles underlying justice as fairness), but that it is nurture that “sets the 
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parameters and guide[s] us towards the acquisition of particular moral systems” (2006, 
p.180).  The brain comes wired with moral modules (“scripts engraved in the mind” and 
operative without conscious awareness, Hauser, 2006, p.99), but differences in moral 
behavior arise as a result of the ways in which cultures ‘use’ the intuitive moral modules by 
relying more heavily on certain modules and less on others, and by assigning differing 
interpretations to the virtues associated with particular modules but within limits imposed by 
the modules (e.g. loyalty is grounded in the reciprocity module but may manifest cross-
culturally as loyalty to different groups) (Haidt & Joseph, 2004).  For example, Graham et al. 
(2009) argued that relying on different sets of moral foundations offers an explanation of 
differences in moral judgment across the US liberal-conservative political spectrum.  Hence, 
if morality is ‘wired’ into Homo sapiens then the wiring is ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’, i.e. the 
expression of morality encapsulated in moral modules is modified by developmental, 
contextual, and cultural factors, and may therefore be subject to refinement and habituation 
(Figure 1). 
Haidt and Joseph (2004) proposed the existence of compassion (suffering), hierarchy, 
reciprocity and purity moral modules, but also speculated that there may be others, for 
example an ‘in-group’ module relating to innately prepared intuitions regarding co-residing 
kin (my preferred term for ‘in-group’ is ‘affiliation’).  These ideas were later formalized into 
a Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) (Haidt & Graham, 2007).  Each MFT module has a 
proper domain, i.e. the problems that presented themselves for thousands generations over 
hundreds of millennia and to which the module was an adaption, and an actual domain i.e. 
“the set of all things in the world that now happen to trigger the module” (Haidt & Joseph, 
2004, p.60, emphases added).  Each of these foundations is characterized by particular 
automatic affective responses of varying levels of intensity and differences in valence (for 
example, high and negative in the case of anger, and low and positive in the case of 
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admiration).  Intuitive responses associated with each module (i.e. moral intuitions or ‘gut 
feelings’) are evoked involuntarily in the actual domains of present-day environments.  For 
example: in the business domain, exploitation of children in the labor markets of third world 
countries may automatically evoke feelings of compassion; abuse of executive power may 
evoke feelings of outrage; opportunities to cooperate in business ventures may evoke feelings 
of gratitude; industrial pollution may evoke feelings of repugnance; affective commitment to 
one’s employing organization may evoke feelings of pride.  Table 2 (see below) adapts and 
extends Haidt and Joseph’s ‘five foundations’ framework (i.e. the MFT) to the business 
context and illustrates this with positive and negative examples for each of the respective 
modules. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Morality was not designed by nature to subjugate individual interests; instead it may be 
seen as a system that emerged out the interaction of the efficient and effective expression and 
resolution of individual and group interests (Flack & de Waal, 2004).  Restraints are placed 
on deviance (“rogue behavior”) by informal rules of the community, and serious deviances 
constrained by more formal rules which act to limit choice or punish deviation from innately 
specified and tacitly understood but culturally expressed rules (Lawrence, 2004, p.75).  Codes 
of business ethics that emphasize the value of honesty, empathy, or reciprocity may advocate 
‘natural’ behaviors however they do not of themselves serve to constrain self-interest 
(Dobson, 2005) or constrain the potentially corrupting power of institutions.  Much 
organizational moral discourse tends to fixate on the codification and enforcement of the 
ethical behaviors which are, or ought to be, observed in practice.  However, even though 
codes of ethics may be one means of managing behaviors, they cannot legislate for the 
attitudes that people hold but do not articulate (Sandler, 2005) or the involuntary intuitions 
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that they experience.  Haidt and Joseph (2004) argued that “a virtuous person is one who has 
the proper automatic [i.e. intuitive] reactions to ethically relevant events” (p.61).  In terms of 
the acquisition of such responses MFT is consistent with those social learning processes in 
which experience, implicit and explicit learning, and feedback gradually attune conscious and 
non-conscious cognition to the intuitive recognition of and response to relevant moral 
prototypes (Bandura, 2002; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Reynolds, 2006; Vygotsky, 1934).  
Without a sufficiency of practice the responses to prototypical triggers are automatic and fast, 
but may or may not be proper under the circumstances; with a sufficiency of the right kind 
practice, responses to prototypical triggers are not only automatic and fast (i.e. intuitive) but 
proper also (i.e. virtuous).  In the Aristotelian and Darwinian tradition we are not born moral, 
but we are constituted by nature with a moral sense and the capacity to habituate the virtues 
in the domains identified by Haidt and Joseph (i.e. purity, reciprocity, affiliation, 
suffering/compassion, hierarchy).  The actions which virtues require in a given context are 
learned from others; hence employees need ‘teachers’ such as bosses, co-workers, trainers, 
coaches, and mentors “who are themselves virtuous” (MacIntyre, 2009, p.88). 
Haidt and Joseph (2004) argued that moral modules were adaptive to the challenges faced 
by our forebears in ancestral environments, for example: prolonged infant dependence made 
it advantageous for mothers to be able to intuitively detect suffering in their offspring; a 
favorable disposition towards hierarchy supported living in large social groups; reciprocity in 
social living brought benefits of cooperation with non-kin, repugnance towards dirty 
conditions militated against infections and parasites.  Various studies (e.g. Bailey & Spicer, 
2007; O’Neill & Petrinovich, 1998) offered support for the view that a general evolved 
‘moral nature’ (i.e. moral sense) influences the resolution of certain ethical dilemmas as they 
arise in relation to group living (e.g. the trolley problem)9.  Such an attributes would be 
adaptive in that they served to enhance inclusive fitness (i.e. of all individuals in the group) 
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and the likelihood of reciprocal altruism, and militated against non-reciprocation, for example 
by weeding-out cheating behaviors (Trivers, 1971).  Natural selection in highly gregarious 
species (such as chimpanzees and Homo sapiens) favors altruistic behavior (Dawkins, 1989; 
Greene, 2003; Mithen, 1996; Trivers, 1971), but as Haidt and Joseph (2004, p.58) noted, the 
hallmark of human empathetic and altruistic behavior, as opposed to that of a chimpanzee is 
“third party concern: person A can get angry at person B for what she did to person C” and 
the potential for a response of compassion extends to that of the suffering of non-kin others 
(Haidt & Joseph, 2004).  Recent findings suggest that brain processes dedicated to social 
cognition and specifically the representation of others’ mental states play in an important role 
in moral judgment (Greene & Haidt, 2002)10. 
In so far as moral behavior within the wider community is perceived and understood, 
social processes such as talking (‘gossiping’) about non-altruism and moral transgressions are 
adaptive to the extent that they enable individuals in a group to quickly and indirectly (i.e. 
efficiently) identify cheaters (i.e. we can learn vicariously who the cheaters are), to 
coordinate actions, and cooperate (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2007; Regan, 2007).  The information 
processing mechanisms underlying these social transactions and interactions are deliberative 
and rational, as well as automatic and intuitive (Reynolds, 2006).  MacIntyre (1999a) noted 
that on occasion we do have to work-out by logical inference what someone else might be 
thinking or feeling, but he acknowledged also that we rely on “a primary and more 
fundamental interpretative knowledge of the thoughts and feelings of others which does not 
have and does not need inferential justification” (p.14).  From a ‘modularity of mind’ 
standpoint Bolender (2001) argued that mentally computing the relevant variables would, 
without the encapsulation of the necessary cognitive and affective functions into intuitive 
modules, be a potentially enormous computational task involving unrestricted memory search 
(i.e. imposing an impossible cognitive load on information processing).  The moral sense 
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affords the individual an autonomous and quick (i.e. intuitive) knowledge of what is just and 
fair, but moral knowledge has both conscious analytical-reflective (“conscious mental 
activity that consists of transforming information about people in order to reach a moral 
judgment”) as well as a non-conscious intuitive-reflexive (“the sudden appearance in 
consciousness of a moral judgment…without any conscious awareness of having gone 
through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion”) components (Haidt, 
2001, p.818).  These reflective/reflexive aspects of moral reasoning are theorized in dual-
processing models of social cognition. 
4. REFLECTIVE AND REFLEXIVE MORAL REASONING 
There has been substantial theoretical convergence within psychology on a view of human 
cognition comprised of specialist automatic systems and sub-systems capable of intuitive 
reflexive processing (including intuitive moral judgment), and general purpose deliberative 
systems and sub-systems capable of reflective analytical processing (including analytical 
moral reasoning) (Reynolds, 2006; Sonenschein, 2007).  This dual conceptualization has a 
long tradition in psychology going back at least as far as William James (e.g. The Varieties of 
Religious Experience, 1902) and C.G. Jung (e.g. Psychological Types, 1921).  It was re-
invigorated a number of decades ago with renewed interest in the ‘cognitive unconscious’ 
and the notion of two parallel (dual) systems of information processing referred to generically 
as System 1 and System 2 (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Wilson, 
Lindsay, & Schooler, 2000).  System 1 processes are contextually dependent, automatic, 
largely unconscious, associative, intuitive, implicit, and relatively undemanding of cognitive 
resources, fast-in-operation (i.e. quick and involuntary) but slow-in-formation (i.e. built-up 
and habituated over many years of experience and learning).  System 2 processes are 
contextually independent, analytic, rule-based, explicit, more demanding of cognitive 
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resources than their System 1 counterparts, slow-in-operation but fast-in-formation (for 
reviews see: Evans, 2008; Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox & Sadler-Smith, 2008; Lieberman, 
2007).  The relationship between the systems is bi-directional, behavior is influenced by a 
combination of both systems, and the relative contribution of each “is a function of the 
situation and the person” (Epstein, 2008, p.25). 
Dual-process theories offer a broad conceptual architecture into which innate and 
instinctive moral responses may be placed, and may be considered analogous to an 
Aristotelian dialectic of deliberation (bouleusis) and desire (epithumia).  There are other 
parallels: the centrality in Aristotle’s moral philosophy of acquiring intellectual virtues by 
instruction and learning, and moral virtues by practising and habituation is commensurable 
with two other aspects of dual-processing, namely that intellectual virtues may be formed 
relatively quickly (“Intellectual virtue owes both its inception and its growth chiefly to 
instruction”, NE, Book II, Chapter i, p.31), whereas moral virtues are formed relatively 
slowly (“Moral goodness…is the result of habit”, NE, Book II, Chapter i, p.31). 
Within the Aristotelian tradition moral virtues are axiomatic to social living; within the 
Darwinian tradition the moral sense is similarly axiomatic.  Evolution has prepared Homo 
sapiens for social life by endowing individuals with the capacity for rapid, involuntary, 
affect-laden concerns (i.e. intuitive moral judgments) regarding social interactions which 
“emerge at various times during childhood, at which point they get built-up or played-down 
by the local culture” (Haidt, 2004, p.286).  Sonenschein (2007) adapted this idea and applied 
it to management in his Sensemaking Intuition Model (SIM) arguing that individuals act like 
‘intuitive moral attorneys’ who search for confirmatory evidence of their initial intuitions, the 
latter are accompanied by high levels of certitude and relatively impervious to 
disconfirmation11.  Reynolds (2006) integrated many of the above lines of evidence in a 
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neurocognitive model of ethical decision making based on ‘reflexive’ and ‘reasoning’ 
information processing cycles and their interactions, constituted within the broader 
conceptual frames of dual-process theory in general and social cognitive neuroscience 
(SCNS) in particular12.  Reynolds’ (2006) posits reflexive pattern matching of the array of 
cues that comprise a moral dilemma (which may be familiar or unfamiliar) against previously 
formulated prototypes (images in a variety of sensory modalities) which are stored in the X-
system (i.e. reflexive) (see Lieberman, Jarcho, & Satpute, 2004).  If automatic search yields a 
match, intuitive reflexive processing ensues; if automatic search fails to yield a match 
abstract decision rules are effortfully applied by the C-system (i.e. reflective) in order to 
determine behavior.  For example, ethical prototypes are ‘compiled’ for bribery, fraud, lying, 
and sexual harassment as a result of experiences which not only include intuitive normative 
evaluations (e.g. ‘bribery is wrong’) and an associated rapid, involuntary, affective reaction to 
bribery (e.g. repugnance), but also more consciously controlled and deliberative 
recommendations that guide behavior (e.g. ‘bribery must be resisted’) (Regan, 2007).  The C-
system’s rule-based analysis and active judgment has the potential to intervene, exercise 
executive control over, and “micromanage” the X-system (Reynolds, 2006, p.740) in a 
process of higher-order conscious reasoning (Epstein referred to this as “a conflict between 
the head and the heart”, 1994, p.710) and learning.  The C-system, as well as providing a 
degree of overall control, also ‘feeds’ the latter with prototypes built-up through exposure, 
experience, and learning in specific socio-cultural complexes: in Aristotelian terms this is the 
development of well-practiced and well-cultivated traits that support moral behavior but 
which may nonetheless have the potential to be based on the “wrong kind of role models” and 
the “wrong kinds of desires, ideas and behavior” (Solomon, 2003, p.49). 
From the behavioral perspective more generally such prototypes are the basis for the 
intuitive expertise (Kahneman & Klein, 2009) that manifests as a result of explicit and 
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implicit learning and of which moral judgment is but one type.  Paralleling this MacIntyre 
(2009) drew our attention to different kinds of phronēsis: a person may have ‘unerring’ (i.e. 
expert) judgment in one area, but be notably lacking in another area, the sources of the 
difference being experience and “the degree to which she or he has been attentive to [i.e. 
learned] what is specific to each kind of experience” (p.149).  Moral instruction may begin in 
the classroom (e.g. using cases and vignettes to elicit intuitive moral reactions, see Haidt, 
2001) however moral learning is situated and crafted to its finest expression in the social 
arenas of practice (Moore, 2002). 
5. SOCIALLY SITUATED ASPECTS OF MORALITY 
Moral sense, individual virtues, and integrity are nourished by ‘the community’, and both 
the individual and the collective have moral agency; any claim to the contrary is a “dangerous 
myth” (Solomon, 2004b, p.1026).  MacIntyre (1981) noted that “the self has to find its moral 
identity through its membership of communities” (p.205), therefore in order to understand 
individual moral sense it is necessary to consider not only the biology and psychology of 
virtue, but also the relevant features of the institutions and social structures (such as business 
organizations) and communities in which moral agency is executed and moral identity 
formed, the moral commitment of others, and the co-evolution of individual and 
organizational moral values within relevant institutional frameworks (Weaver, 2006).  From 
the biological and behavioral stance, although intuition is argued to be the ‘default setting’ 
for moral judgment (Haidt, 2004), reasoning in private or public dialogues is called for and 
called upon when “intuitions conflict” or when the social situation “demands thorough 
examination” of the facets of a moral dilemma (Haidt, 2001, p. 820).  The biological bases of 
the moral modules exist independently of the institutional framework; their manifestation in 
moral agency is mediated through the processes of moral cognition and moral metacognition 
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(Figure 1), which take place within social structures and/or institutional frameworks.  But the 
latter are not a gestalt, instead they imply a plurality of roles, i.e. when a manager “shifts 
from the sphere of the family to that of the corporation he or she necessarily shifts moral 
perspective” (MacIntyre [1979] cited in Moore, 2005, p.242). 
MacIntyre (1999b) coined the term ‘compartmentalization’ to refer to distinct spheres of 
social activity each having their own role structure and norms that exist relatively 
independently of those in other compartments of the social order (e.g. roles of manager, 
parent, or citizen) and which “dictate which kinds of consideration are to be treated as 
relevant to decision making and which are to be excluded” (p.322).  A negative consequence 
of this compartmentalization is a ‘divided self’ devoid of moral conflicts and tensions whose 
practical reasoning is restricted and ultimately terminated by active refusal when a moral 
dilemma directs one beyond one’s current socially approved role entailing also an active 
rebuttal of the moral sense.  For MacIntyre individuals are responsible co-authors of their 
own active refusals and denials to ‘know what they do not know’ and thereby stand “guilty” 
(p.329), moreover in doing so they condemn themselves to be diminished as moral agents 
incapable of recognizing and transcending compartmentalization of roles and responsibilities, 
or of displaying either integrity or constancy.  Such active refusals, commensurate with 
publically or socially approved roles, may counter a biologically-based moral sense which 
gives “the impulse to some of [mankind’s] best actions; but his actions are in a higher degree 
determined by the expressed wishes and judgment of his fellow men, and unfortunately by 
his own strong selfish desires” (Darwin, 1879/2004, p.133).  Active refusals and active 
rebuttals constitute a diminishing of moral agency. 
The excellences associated with the ‘craft’ of a community of practitioners are internal to 
those practices (Beadle & Moore, 2006) but they are shaped (either for good or for bad) in the 
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context of institutional frameworks and socially approved roles (MacIntyre, 1999b).  The 
latter may have a corrupting effect on excellence and “the internal goods thereby obtainable” 
(Moore & Beadle, 2006, p.374), be counter to the biological bases of morality, and be more 
or less severe under different sets of circumstances (Neilsen, 2006).  Individual and 
organizational moral character and collective mastery of the virtues resides in the reciprocal 
and reflexive relationship between individuals and institutions, and between intellect and 
instinct (moral sense).  Figure 2 illustrates virtuous agency (Moore & Beadle, 2006) as telos 
from the multiple perspectives of biology, cognition, communities, social structures, and 
institutions. 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Intellectual and moral excellence is attained through the mastery of the internal goods of a 
practice (MacIntyre, 1985) and contributes to the greater good of the polis, hence excellences 
are situated within a practiced-based community (which from a MacIntyrean perspective 
would encompass discharging roles and functions as members of communities, such as a 
string quartet or a fishing crew, see MacIntyre, 1985).  MacIntyre viewed practice as “any 
coherent and complex form of socially established human activity through which goods 
internal to that form of activity are realized” (1985, p.187).  The realization and habituation 
of moral virtue depends upon the proper shaping (i.e. recognition, refinement and habituation, 
see Figure 1) of moral sense within a community (Rooney & McKenna, 2008).  This position 
is commensurable with the situated perspective (Lave & Wenger, 1991) in which learning is 
viewed as woven within the fabric of the context within which it occurs, shaped by the 
context, and its norms, codes, and conventions.  Lave and Wenger (1991) defined a 
community of practice as: 
“…a set of relations among persons, activity and the world, over time and in 
relation with other tangential and overlapping communities of practice.  A 
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community of practice is an intrinsic condition for the existence of knowledge, 
not least because it provides the interpretive support necessary for making sense 
of its heritage” (1991: 98) 
The above warrants comparison with MacIntyre’s (1985) description of practice: 
“Any coherent and complex form of socially established human activity 
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of 
trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to 
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended” (p.187). 
Competition is neither alien to nor incommensurable with either perspective.  In 
MacIntyre (1985) competition entails excelling to the mutual benefit of all members of the 
community engaged in the practice (Moore, 2002).  Excelling in the practices of the 
community improves the shared repertoire of knowledge and skills distributed amongst 
members of the community through participation and learning thereby increasing the 
competitiveness of the group13. 
Within a community the formation of moral character is constant and on-going, it is a state 
of “constant becoming”, and an object of constant re-negotiation with and in relation to 
ourselves and others (see: Wenger, 1998, p.154).  For example, I reinterpret Wenger’s 
example of the hospital doctor is in the domain of business ethics thus: 
For a manager, making decisions that do justice to her moral identity and 
the bottom-line demands of her organization is not “simply a matter of making 
discrete decisions” she must find a moral identity that can reconcile the 
sometimes conflicting and competing demands of the moral instinct, 
accountability to herself (i.e. as a moral agent), to her community of practice (e.g. 
the internal goods of the management team), her organization (e.g. the external 
goods), and “the wider macro-social institutional frameworks in which these are 
set” into a moral “way of being in the world” (p.160). 
Wenger singled out the work of reconciliation (a dialectic) as being the most significant 
challenge faced by those learning any craft (e.g. management), similarly becoming a virtuous 
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agent occurs by negotiation and reconciliation across decisions and domains (integrity and 
constancy of innate moral sense serves as an ethical ‘centre of gravity’ or ‘moral compass’) 
and across time (from being a less virtuous to more virtuous agent) within the limits 
proscribed by morality’s intuitive foundations and against a backcloth of multiple and 
shifting institutional frameworks (see Figure 2).  In this respect Wenger paralleled 
MacIntyre’s compartmentalization view of contemporary social life: 
“a theatre with a set of adjoining stages upon which a number of very 
different moral philosophical dramas are being acted out, the actors being 
required to switch from stage to stage, from character to character, often with 
astonishing rapidity” (MacIntyre, 1979, p.127-128). 
Moore (2005) has drawn our attention to an outcome of this: the creation of more than one 
self, with the potential for the individual moral agent to fashion (or fabricate) more than one 
distinct character, and the possibility of an institution with an appetite for the avaricious 
pursuit of external goods such as money, status, or power “forcing a deep division within the 
character of the individual” (p.243).  MacIntyre argued recently (i.e. post-‘credit crunch’) that 
the skills of ‘money men’ (e.g. derivatives traders) who are guided solely by external goods 
are inimical to the virtues, but was unsurprised by this given that the financial sector is an 
environment of ‘bad character’ (Cornwell, 2010) 
Integrity and constancy are meta-virtues in this regard: integrity requires refusal to be one 
kind of person in one context and a quite different one in another; constancy extends integrity 
by requiring a commitment to the goods over an extended period of time (and not be 
distracted by the requirements of different social contexts or institutional frameworks) and 
the habituation of proper intuitive moral responses to ethically-charged events (MacIntyre, 
1999b; Moore, 2005).  Moore (2005) sees the virtues not as ends in themselves but as the 
means for an individual to achieve the ends of their telos (something not yet ‘adequately 
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characterized’ partly known but partly unknown, and essentially existential), perhaps a place 
that individuals arrive at “somewhere around early middle age before they can even conceive 
of these notions” (p.246).  The trajectory of the emergence of a virtuous self may be likened 
to the notion of a ‘unity’ (in Jungian terms a move toward ‘individuation’ through resolution 
of dialectics) conceived and evaluated whole, as a narrative in relation to the moral 
relationship one has with one’s intuitive and rational self and with others, and with an 
awareness of where the narrative is headed (Moore, 2005).  For MacIntyreans moral learning 
and the quest for the good involves encounters with various “harms, dangers, temptations, 
and distractions” (MacIntyre, 1981, p.204) along the way and the overcoming of these by the 
exercising of the virtues which provide a bulwark against tendencies to avarice (Moore, 
2005).  Moral learning is metacognitive14 to the extent that it involves second-order processes 
invoked by an individual to monitor, reflect on and make sense of first-order moral intuitions 
(Hartman, 2004; Tappan, 1990) and thereby ‘know ourselves’ (see Cosmides & Toobey, 
2004). 
6. MORAL LEARNING AND MORAL METACOGNITION 
Becoming a virtuous agent (Beadle & Moore, 2005) is founded in an innate moral sense, 
e.g. automatically evoked moral responses to compassion/suffering, hierarchy, reciprocity, 
purity, and affiliation (Haidt & Joseph, 2004), with the strong caveat that behaviors based on 
intuitive moral judgments are not of necessity virtuous (e.g. when intuitive and well-practiced 
well-practised virtues such as obedience are confronted by unpracticed situations, Solomon, 
2003)15.  But becoming virtuous is not automatic; it is the result of practice and habituation 
through the interplay of the ‘hot’ reflexive operations of System 1 (intuition and affect) and 
the ‘cold’ reflective operations of System 2 (analysis and reason).  Moreover human beings - 
unique amongst the social animals - are endowed with a capacity for spoken and written 
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language and a capability to articulate, reflect on, interpret and make sense of the operations 
and outputs of conscious and non-conscious cognitions.  The development of moral character 
is a cognitive and metacognitive moral learning project in the pursuit of the practical 
refinement of the moral sense, rather than a normative ethical educational project seeking 
intellectual resolution of generalized or abstract moral questions (i.e. moral instruction may 
be a prerequisite for moral learning but it cannot substitute for it).  If this stance has a 
normative dimension, it is this: managers and leaders should aspire towards and takes steps to 
possess a self-knowledge concerning the cognitive, conative, and affective processes of mind 
as they pertain to their own intuitive moral responses to the ethical challenges and dilemmas 
they face; hence a central element of business leaders’ and managers’ moral education and 
training should be a virtue-based moral metacognition. 
How might this be achieved?  Briefly, the ‘five foundations’ or Moral Foundations Theory 
(MFT) (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2005) provides a scientific basis for the 
further development of an intuitive ethics curriculum.  In the classroom business ethics cases 
could be written based on the kinds of examples cited in Table 2 incorporating relevant 
stimuli (e.g. visual, aural, olfactory, narrative, metaphorical) to evoke affective responses (i.e. 
moral intuitions) and analyzed both objectively (in terms of telos, internal and external goods, 
and of compassion/suffering, hierarchy, reciprocity, purity, and affiliation) and subjectively 
(in terms of evoked affective moral responses).  Beyond the classroom in the arena of 
practice moral actors refine their objective and subjective moral knowledge both by reflecting 
in moral action (i.e. responding and reasoning in real-time in the midst of a moral dilemma 
see Schön, 1983) and reflecting on moral action (e.g. by recalling puzzling or perplexing 
features of a moral dilemma, reflecting on and questioning the events as they appear to have 
unfolded, questioning one’s feelings, assumptions, thoughts and actions, and generating new 
prototypes).  In doing so employees may be enabled and thereby empowered to re-
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conceptualize (through recognition, refinement and habituations) what their acknowledged 
feelings (‘hot’ cognitions), thoughts (‘cold’ cognitions), and actions are or were in situations 
where they may be or have been called upon to be moral agents, moreover in doing so they 
may come to challenge and overcome institutionally- or socially-derived threats to integrity 
and constancy (see Moore, 2005). 
As noted above, experience and reflective inquiry in general has the potential to build 
good judgment and intuitive expertise (Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004; Simon, 1987).  Intuitive 
experts in a given domain (e.g. morality) likely to have more and better-organized moral 
knowledge structures than novices, show greater situation awareness, and possess more 
complex and automated procedures for solving complex moral problems quickly (Lapsley & 
Hill, 2008).  In the classical Aristotelian/Darwinian tradition, and from the moral 
metacognition perspective, the development of moral goodness is a process of becoming 
more expert in the exercising of the moral senses (to which we are predisposed biologically) 
through reflection and reason.  Properly-refined these innate moral dispositions become 
‘frozen into habit’ through repeated experience, practice, correction of errors, instruction, role 
modeling, coaching, feedback, and reflection in and on moral actions in a given domain 
across multiple situations, collectively, and over time.  However, given that the number of 
possible moral decisions and dilemmas is infinite, the virtues always have the potential to be 
unpracticed (see Solomon, 2004b) and hence deployed unskillfully, i.e. without 
‘craftsmanship’ (Moore, 2005) thereby rendering moral learning and moral metacognition 
lifelong projects in becoming virtuous. 
CONCLUSION 
Employees who exhibit virtuous agency have learned the practical wisdom to be able to 
navigate “complex situations where incompatible principles compete” (Hartman, 1998, p.65), 
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and also reconcile tensions where the ‘head’ and the ‘heart’ conflict.  The habituation of 
proper intuitive moral responses through self-reflective moral learning has the potential to 
endow managers with the ability to see business situations holistically and quickly “grasp 
their relevant features and to anticipate the moral, social and financial implications of 
decisions” (Roca, 2007).  Intuitive moral responses are neither good nor bad per se: 
organizations need well-honed, non-conscious reflexive moral intuitions, but they also need 
to “blunt the impact of others” by encouraging more conscious reflective moral reasoning 
(Regan, 2007, p.985) founded upon a moral metacognition.  The fact that the human brain is 
designed in such a way as to predispose Homo sapiens to respond to ethical dilemmas 
intuitively and in particular ways (Haidt & Joseph, 2004) and that biologically-based virtues 
can be crafted in the arena of practice suggests that if members of business organizations can 
be educated as to the biological realities of their moral cognitions “fewer constraints [e.g. 
rules or codes] will be needed at higher levels” in business organizations (Lawrence, 2004, 
p.75).  The normative strictures of institutions and organizations can create venues of virtue 
or of vice for us all: with respect to the moral threat of vice, convention can be resistant to 
change, reinforce dominant discourses, compartmentalize morality, and be counter to the 
“root that contains the very systems by which we are able to respond to our ailing world – the 
biology of our brains” (van Wensveen, 2005, p.188).  Good business requires an informed 
intuitive moral awareness and a well-practiced moral agency situated within the intellectual 
and moral excellences of a community of practice wherein it is permissible to question and 
reject common knowledge and received wisdom, transcend the taken-for-granted (Rooney & 
McKenna, 2008), and protect against collective ‘bad side’ hazards such as the “forced 
sacrifice of livelihood or dignity in pursuit of organizational goals” (Snell, 2001, p.323).  
Educational programs can provide instruction in the foundations of objective moral 
knowledge, but organizations themselves are the only venues where a subjective, i.e. 
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personal, moral sense for good business may be honed, exercised, and practiced authentically.  
The discourses that are the fabric of mutual engagement in communities of practitioners can 
habituate virtue or they may hinder its refinement.  Dominant discourses that set limits on 
collective moral character stand to be challenged and may be exposed through reflexive and 
reflective moral reasonings (Reynolds, 2006; Rooney & McKenna, 2008).  Without 
collectively exercised virtues, practices and practitioners may be unable to resist the 
potentially “corrupting power of institutions” (MacIntyre, 1985, p.194).  Taken to its extreme 
the instrumentality of the institution may cleave the individual from her or his intuitive 
evolved moral nature before virtue has the opportunity to reveal itself. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework for moral metacognition 
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Figure 2.  Virtuous agency as telos from the perspectives of biology, cognition, community, 
social structures, and institutions (after: Moore, 2002, p.21; Moore & Beadle, 2006, 
pp.372&373) 
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PHILOSOPHICAL SPIRITUAL BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
Moral Virtues 
(Nicomachean Ethics, 
Appendix 1, 1953/2004)  
Buddhist Eight-
fold Path (see 
Goenka, 1993) 
Moral Modules (five 
foundations theory of 
intuitive ethics) 
(Haidt & Joseph, 
2004) 
Virtue Clusters  
(positive psychology) 
(Seligman, 2002) 
Organizational Moral 
Values (Scott, 2002) 
Environmental Virtues 
(van Wensveen, 2005) 
Courage 
Temperance 
Liberality 
Magnificence 
Magnanimity 
Proper ambition 
Patience 
Truthfulness 
Wittiness 
Friendliness 
Modesty 
Righteous indignation 
Wisdom: right 
view and 
intention 
Ethical conduct: 
right speech, 
action, and 
livelihood 
Mental 
development: 
right effort, 
mindfulness, and 
concentration 
Suffering 
Hierarchy 
Reciprocity 
Purity 
Affiliation 
Wisdom and knowledge 
Courage 
Humanity and love 
Justice 
Temperance 
Transcendence 
Organizational justice 
Honest organizational 
communication 
Respect for property 
Respect for life 
Respect for religion 
Care 
Respect 
Love 
Compassion 
Reverence 
Humility 
Creativity 
Hope 
Sensitivity 
Table 1.  Summary and examples of virtues, moral modules, signature strengths, organizational moral values, and environmental virtues 
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 INTUITIVE MORAL MODULES 
 Suffering/Compassion Hierarchy Reciprocity Purity Affiliation 
Proper domain 
(examples from 
ancestral 
environment) 
Suffering and 
vulnerability of one’s 
own children; Caring 
for elders 
Physical size and 
strength; Domination and 
protection against 
enemies / other physical 
threats 
Cheating versus 
cooperation in joint 
activities; Sharing 
resources; Co-sheltering 
People with diseases or 
parasites; Waste 
products; Rotting or 
unclean food 
Kin attachment; Tribe 
membership; In-group 
Intuitive affective 
response 
Distress (-ve);  
Compassion (+ve) 
Sorrow (-ve) 
Sympathy (+ve) 
Anger (-ve) 
Admiration (+ve) 
Awe (+ve) 
Fear (-ve) 
Respect (+ve) 
Intimidation (-ve) 
Resentment (-ve) 
Humility (+ve) 
Bitterness (-ve) 
Generosity (+ve) 
Gratitude (+ve) 
Disgust (-ve) 
Repulsion (-ve) 
Repugnance (-ve) 
Aversion (-ve) 
Nausea (-ve) 
Pride (+ve) 
Antipathy (-ve) 
Antagonism (-ve) 
Trust (+ve) 
Loyalty (+ve) 
Actual domain 
(examples of 
business 
environments) 
Labor market 
exploitation 
Charitable acts 
Leader-follower 
relationships 
Abuse of executive 
power 
Cooperative ventures 
Networks 
Industrial pollution 
Occupational and public 
health 
Team working 
Affective organizational 
commitment 
Suggested business 
examples for class 
room cases 
Child labor in clothing 
supply chains 
Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation 
The Fairtrade 
Foundation 
Collective non-
compliance at Enron 
Intimidation by 
Chairman / CEO Lehman 
Brothers 
CEO Kelleher at 
Southwest Airlines 
Cooperative 
relationships amongst 
firms in Silicon Valley  
Guanxi 
“You scratch my back, 
I’ll scratch yours” 
Halal / Kosher retailing 
and restaurants 
Marketing of ‘pure’ 
mineral waters 
Organizational 
institutional racism 
SAS Business Analytics 
(Fortune Best 100 
Companies to Work 
For) 
Table 2. Five intuitive moral modules, intuitive affective responses (+ve, positively valenced; -ve, negatively valenced), domains (proper and 
actual), and business examples (positive and negative) (adapted from: Haidt and Joseph, 2004, p.59) 
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ENDNOTES 
1 According to Midgley (2010a) in her critique of ‘pseudo-Darwinists’ E.O. Wilson has “quite ceased to preach 
socio-biology, and finds this idea [i.e. moral sense] extremely interesting and is now developing it” (p.39). 
2 In so far as philosophy and the psychology of moral reasoning is concerned Kant’s influence is seminal to the 
Kohlbergian moral reasoning approach which aimed to help learners move progressively through stages (cf. 
Piaget) of moral reasoning by presenting them with increasingly complex moral dilemmas thereby fostering 
moral development (Graham, et al., 2008). 
3 These connections are however not undisputed, see Blasi (1990) for a critical account of the relationship 
between moral philosophy and psychology. 
4 ‘Proper’ in this sense refers to the set of problems that an adaptation evolved to solve (i.e. in the ancestral 
environment); ‘actual’ refers to the set of problems that the adaption is currently concerned with (i.e. 
business organizations). 
5 See Blanchard (2009) and Sutherland and Hughes (2000) for a critique of Arnhart (1998). 
6 Group size and brain size are strongly positively associated in living primates (Dunbar, 1992; Mithen, 1996). 
7 Universal moral grammars (UMGs) provide an analogue for Chomskyan linguistic grammars (see Mikhail, 
2007). 
8 The Pleistocene began approximately 2.6 million years ago and ended 12,000 years ago, it was characterised 
by repeated glacial cycles the most recent of which began approximately 70,000 years ago and ended 15,000 
years ago. 
9 As Pinker (2007) noted in relation to the trolley problem and its variants: “A person who is capable of heaving 
a struggling man over a bridge…is probably capable of other horrific acts that lack a redeeming reduction in 
the body count” (p.231) 
10 ‘Theory of mind’ (ToM) enables an individual to “attribute independent metal states to self and others in order 
to explain and predict behavior” (Frith & Happé, 1994, p.116).  Lieberman argued that the “sense of 
experiencing other minds appears to recruit brain regions more closely tied with automatic and affective 
processes” (2007, p.265) and that lateral temporal cortex in particular supports automatic and non-reflective 
aspects of ToM (Lieberman, 2009, p.21). 
11 The sense in which the term ‘intuition’ is used in this article differs from ‘Kantian intuitionism’: in the former 
it is an “affectively charged judgement that arises through rapid, non-conscious and holistic associations” 
(Dane & Pratt, 2007, p.40); latter is an intuitionism that appeals to “ethical standards that thoughtful, 
educated people, find intuitive” (Arnold, Audi, & Zwolinski, 2010, p.566). 
12 De Schrijver (2009) however, noted apparent discrepancies between the evolutionary psychology (EP) 
account of morality and the CNS account: the former is concerned with the role of more or less independent 
and innate brain systems (modules), whereas in the latter a stronger emphasis is placed on cognition and the 
importance of learning processes.  De Schrijver concluded that these apparent discrepancies are attributable 
merely to the different perspectives, i.e. “either zoomed out” (i.e. EP’s account) or “zoomed in” (CNS’s 
account) adopted by each (Verplaeste, Braeckman, & De Schrijver, 2009, p.39). 
 40
                                                                                                                                                        
13 MacIntyre’s ‘practice-based community’ is distinct from Lave and Wenger’s ‘community of practice’.  
MacIntyre has engaged directly with the corrupting power of business organization on practice to the extent 
that “‘much modem industrial productive and service work is organised so as to exclude the features 
distinctive of a practice’ and in such a way that this type of economic activity is ‘at once alien and 
antagonistic to practices’” (cited in Moore, 2005, p.241).  Lave and Wenger did not concern themselves with 
any such ‘corrupting power’ in the MacIntyrean sense. 
14 Metacognition was defined by Flavell (1976, p.232) as “knowledge concerning one’s own cognitive processes 
or anything related to them, e.g. learning-relevant properties of information or data”. 
15 As Regan (2007) noted: “How we are is not necessarily how we would like to be.  Indeed morality can be 
seen as an effort to bridge the gap…aside from the pitfalls of the naturalistic fallacy, those [innate] 
tendencies may have emerged and played a role at a stage in human evolution far different from our current 
circumstances” (p.945).  Nonetheless, even if we are not compelled to follow our moral instinct, we are well-
advised to understand it. 
